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Abstract
Despite decades of research on social capital, studies that explore the relationship between political institutions and
generalized trust–a key element of social capital–across time are sparse. To address this issue, we use various cross-national
public-opinion data sets including the World Values Survey and employ pooled time-series OLS regression and fixed- and
random-effects estimation techniques on an unbalanced panel of 74 countries and 248 observations spread over a 29-year
time period. With these data and methods, we investigate the impact of five political-institutional factors–legal property
rights, market regulations, labor market regulations, universality of socioeconomic provisions, and power-sharing capacity–
on generalized trust. We find that generalized trust increases monotonically with the quality of property rights institutions,
that labor market regulations increase generalized trust, and that power-sharing capacity of the state decreases generalized
trust. While generalized trust increases as the government regulation of credit, business, and economic markets decreases
and as the universality of socioeconomic provisions increases, both effects appear to be more sensitive to the countries
included and the modeling techniques employed than the other political-institutional factors. In short, we find that political
institutions simultaneously promote and undermine generalized trust.
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Introduction
Interest in trust has a long tradition in the social sciences and is
considered a core dimension of social capital [1,2,3,4]. For Georg
Simmel, trust is ‘‘one of the most synthetic forces of society’’[5]; for
Robert Putnam, ‘‘honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable
frictions of social life’’[2]; and for the economist Kenneth Arrow,
‘‘virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an
element of trust’’[6]. Despite the prolonged interdisciplinary
significance of trust, only in the last two decades have scholars
of social capital considered the causes and consequences of an
alternative yet closely related microfoundation known as general-
ized trust [7]. At the heart of this growing literature is the idea that
generalized trust, or optimistic expectations about the trustwor-
thiness of strangers, is important not just for the development of
trust in known others but also for social order in general: it fosters
cooperation across various political, economic, and social realms,
and is thought to produce numerous normatively desirable
outcomes such as economic growth [8,9], life satisfaction [10],
civic morality [2], and lower crime rates [11].
As one might suspect, the possible contextual sources of
generalized trust are as equally diverse as its consequences [7,12,
13]. For instance, numerous cross-national studies find political
institutions to be closely related to generalized trust [14,15,
16,17,18,19,20,21]. Yet much controversy surrounds questions of
which political institutions actually shape beliefs about the reliability
of strangers in a given population. Some studies emphasize the
effectiveness and quality of legal property rights institutions as the
primary source of generalized trust [15], while others underscore
the power-sharing capacities of the state [18], the government
regulation of markets [22], or the universality of socioeconomic
provisions [20]. But since cross-sectional studies populate this
literature, it is plausible that issues of unobserved heterogeneity and
simultaneity bias the results.
To address these problems, the present study fits fixed- and
random-effects models to unbalanced cross-sectional time-series
panel data from a wide variety of cross-national public opinion
data sets administered in 74 countries between the years 1980 and
2009 to advance our understanding of how, why, and what
political-institutional factors influence generalized trust through
time. The panel structure of the data allows us to properly address
issues of selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity and provides
an opportunity to explore the underlying relationship between
political institutions and generalized trust. This study is the first to
engage in such an enterprise.
The findings show that generalized trust increases monotoni-
cally with the quality of property rights institutions, that labor
market regulations increase generalized trust, and that power-
sharing capacity of the state decreases generalized trust. While
generalized trust increases as the government regulation of credit,
business, and economic markets decreases and as the universality
of socioeconomic provisions increases, both effects are more
sensitive to influential cases, to modeling specifications, and to the
types of countries included than the other political-institutional
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simultaneously promote and undermine generalized trust.
Political-institutional Foundations of Generalized Trust
Scholars who study the relationship between political institu-
tions and generalized trust generally focus on four competing
factors. First, most social scientists agree that our daily activities
consist of situations in which we rely on actors we know very little
about to help us accomplish tasks that are difficult to do alone,
such as hire a lawyer to represent us in court, consult a
dermatologist to screen us for skin cancer, or employ a computer
scientist to design a webpage. It is generally recognized that a
requisite amount of optimism concerning the trustworthiness of
anonymous others must be in place in order to support such
transactions; without this generalized trust, actors have little desire
to risk exchange and good reason to avoid mutually beneficial lost
opportunities. According to some scholars, the most effective
means to foster generalized trust is to implement institutional
incentives that induce actors we cannot readily judge or monitor to
act in our interests and to behave in ways that we might call
reliable [23,24,25]. In this way, institutional incentives create an
environment where what is known by one actor about trustwor-
thiness is also known by all other actors and that each actor holds
optimistic expectations concerning the trustworthiness of anony-
mous others.
Among the variety of state enforcement mechanisms, rules of
the game manifested as legal property rights are the most critical
for the development of generalized trust [15,20,26,27]. These
institutional incentives go about promoting generalized trust
indirectly and directly. Indirectly, institutional constraints buttress
an environment where people can take risks and cooperate with
others they know nothing about even if neither actor finds the
other actor trustworthy or if neither actor holds optimistic
expectations about the trustworthiness of strangers. If both actors
exchange and benefit from this cooperative endeavor, then both
actors update their beliefs concerning the other’s trustworthiness
and update their beliefs about the trustworthiness of strangers
[23,24]. The more interactions an actor experiences like this, the
more optimistic they become about anonymous others. Directly,
institutional incentives allow individuals to feel safe and secure in
their exchanges with others [28]. As long as these incentives
provide the perception that institutional actors are able to
minimize opportunism, then institutions foster the belief and
expectation that anonymous others are reliable. If, on the other
hand, institutional incentives are absent, then this fosters
pessimistic expectations about a stranger’s trustworthiness. In
either case, generalized trust is an indirect or direct result of
institutional incentives.
Second, some social scientists suggest that political institutions
used to promote reliability and trustworthiness ironically
undermine the very things they are implemented to promote
[29,30,31,32]. Although this tradition generally focuses on all
apparatuses of the state, we follow Aghion et al. [22] and restrict
the undermining effects of government on generalized trust to
the regulation of economic, business, and credit markets. Despite
our restriction, at the heart of this tradition is the notion that
political institutions undermine social cohesion and generalized
trust via the mechanism of dependence: in the presence of
centralized market regulations, individuals come to depend on
those regulations and agents of the state, instead of each other, to
promote mutually beneficial market outcomes. Cooperation and
economic exchange, as a consequence, becomes less a result of
interdependence and more a result of market regulation. This
ultimately leads to the deterioration of community and civil
society, fewer acts of altruism, a self-reinforcing dependence on
state institutions to foster economic transactions, and a decline in
generalized trust [22]. The implication is that generalized trust
flourishes in the absence of government regulation, and that
generalized trust wanes, although does not entirely disappear, in
the presence of government regulation.
Yet not all market regulations undermine generalized trust.
Efforts by the state to control labor markets with minimum wage
laws, with prescriptions for collective bargaining, and with hiring
and firing regulations, to name a few, increase generalized trust. In
effect, these practices expand the rights of citizens and attempt to
integrate the working class within the larger social system [33]. As
Marshall [34] classically argued, these rights foster egalitarian
economic systems and nationalistic social bonds that unify citizens.
Both of which plant the seeds for generalized trust, especially
among those who benefit from citizenship rights. In short, labor
market regulations indirectly breed generalized trust by promoting
egalitarianism and by fostering social integration.
Third, while some scholars emphasize political-institutional
security and market regulation, others underscore the extent to
which political institutions publicly allocate resources and are
universally oriented [20,35]. The argument here is that universal
political institutions, such as welfare states, reduce the perception
that government sides with certain economic actors over others.
This helps generate the impression that each citizen has an equal
opportunity for success and failure, creating a sense of shared
fate, collective cohesion, and group solidarity that yields
generalized trust [20,36]. In other words, unfair governments
foster economic inequality, inequality of opportunity, and
unevenly distributed resources. When this occurs, social divisions
and class hierarchies become ever more salient and perceptions
of shared fate decline along with trust in generalized others [10].
The single way to overcome this outcome is with a government
that equally divides public resources and enacts universal social
welfare programs focused on leveling socioeconomic differences.
Fourth, some scholars suggest that the power-sharing capacity
of the state is what fuels generalized trust [18,37,38]. Two possible
mechanisms account for this effect. The first, cognitive inferences,
suggests that certain kinds of prior experiences with other citizens
is critical for the development of generalized trust [36]. In
particular, if citizens are embedded within a partisan regime that is
biased towards certain interests, then this regime fosters distrust
among the disadvantaged and excluded groups. If, on the other
hand, political institutions are non-partisan and welcome all
interests to the political process, then generalized trust grows.
Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes generally fall with the
former, while democracies and systems of proportional represen-
tation generally fall with the latter. The second mechanism,
socialization through transmission, refers to the capacity of
political institutions to shape public opinion and build value-
consensus [39]. The idea here is that habit-formative elements of
power-sharing political institutions, such as a spirited associational
life and consensus decision-making processes, permits the
participation of all interests in the political process and, as a
result, fosters generalized trust.
To summarize, the relationship between political institutions
and generalized trust is complex and dynamic: some political-
institutional elements foster generalized trust, while others
undermine its development. These elements include property
rights institutions, government regulation of economic, credit, and
business markets, centralized regulation of labor markets, universal
socioeconomic provisions, and power-sharing capacities of the
state. Below we review the empirical evidence in support of these
arguments.
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35120Political-institutions and Generalized Trust: The Evidence
Studies using cross-sectional data and ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression tend to show that property rights institutions,
court independence, contract enforcement, welfare state develop-
ment, and democracy significantly and positively relate to
aggregated micro-level public-opinion survey data of generalized
trust [14,17,20,21,40,41], while institutional transitions, corrup-
tion, and centralized market regulations tend to undermine
generalized trust [20,22]. Moreover, studies using ridge regression
[42] or hierarchical linear models (HLM) in which observations
are clustered into higher-level units typically parallel studies using
OLS regression [15,16,19,43,44,45,46].
Although insightful, the association observed in these studies
might represent a cause, an effect, or a common cause. A key
assumption in both OLS and HLM is strict exogeneity: to the
extent that generalized trust determines one or more of the
independent variables in the equation (i.e., endogenizes the
exogenous variables), then returned estimates will be biased and
inconsistent, revealing an invalid directional association. While
some studies attempt to overcome this bias with the method of
instrumental variables using 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression
[47,48,49,50,51], the results are mixed as a consequence of
empirically, historically, and/or theoretically suspect instruments
[52,53]. For instance, it is common to use gross domestic product
[49], ethnolinguistic homogeneity [40], or legal origins [47] as
instrumental variables for political institutions. While the instru-
ments in these studies typically pass common instrument validity
tests (e.g., the Cragg-Donald F statistic), rarely do these studies
discuss and provide concrete evidence for independence (i.e.,
explain theoretically and empirically why an instrument is
uncorrelated with unobserved causes of the outcome), the
exclusion restriction (i.e., explain theoretically and empirically
why an instrument does not have a direct effect on the outcome),
or monotonicity (i.e., explain why the treatment is not available to
those in the control group) [53]. In fact, we argue that the
commonly used instrumental variables for political institutions
thus far, such as gross domestic product, fail to satisfy any of these
aforementioned requirements.
As a consequence, we still know very little about the political-
institutional determinants of generalized trust. While research
points to an association between these two factors, the causal effect
might not run from institutions to generalized trust but from
generalized trust to institutions [3,18,48,50,54] since the validity of
instrumental variables for political institutions remains a conten-
tious topic [55,56,57]. An alternative and some might say superior
method is to employ modeling techniques that consider time [58].
Yet only one study in the literature has modeled such a
relationship [18]. Although foundational, this study is not without
shortcomings: it employed a small sample of 46 countries where
maximum-likelihood missing value techniques were used on half of
the sample, which can bias results [59]; it used cross-lagged
structural equation panel models that did not account for time-
invariant unobservables; and it explored only one element of
political institutions, namely democracy.
In short, while these findings provide important insights into
how and why political institutions simultaneously promote and
undermine generalized trust, many questions remain. In particu-
lar, these studies show that time must be taken seriously as we
assess the crowding-in and crowding-out effects of political
institutions on generalized trust; that is, nearly all of the studies
outlined above neglect to examine how changes in political
institutions affect generalized trust. The goal of the present study is
to address these remaining issues. We do so using fixed- and
random-effects models that control for unobserved heterogeneity
and address simultaneity.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All data used for the present study is secondary and publicly
available. Human subjects were not directly contacted or surveyed
by the author. The study was approved by the Human Subjects
Division of the author’s university.
Operationalization
We measure generalized trust by aggregating answers to the
following binary question: ‘‘Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people?’’ In other words, it is the proportion of
respondents–multiplied by 100–who say that most people can be
trusted (ranging from 0 to 100). While this operationalization is not
without criticism [60,61,62,63,64], we nevertheless rely on this
measure for three reasons. First, scholars across various disciplines
use it on a consistent basis [2,10,14,18,21,47,65], which facilitates
cross-study comparisons. Second, recent research finds that in
non-Confucian countries this operationalization of generalized
trust sufficiently captures the notion that respondents think about
people they do not know personally and have not yet met [66,67].
Third, it is the only operationalization of generalized trust that
spans the various time-series public opinion data sets we use. The
unbalanced panel data on generalized trust are drawn from six
waves of the World Values Survey (1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–
1998, 1999–2004, 2005–2009), four waves of the Latinobarometer
(Bolivia 1996, 2000, 2005; Brazil 2000; Columbia 2000; Costa
Rica 1996, 2000, 2005; Dominican Republic 2004, 2005; Ecuador
1996, 2000, 2005; El Salvador 1996, 2000, 2005; Guatemala
1996, 2000; Honduras 1996, 2000, 2005; Nicaragua 1996, 2000,
2005; Panama 1996, 2000, 2005; Paraguay 1996, 2000, 2005;
Uruguay 2000; Venezuela 2005), four waves of the Afrobarometer
(Algeria 2006; Botswana 1999, 2005; Namibia 1999, 2005;
Tanzania 2005; Zambia 2001), four waves of the Asiabarometer
(Bangladesh 2005; Pakistan 2005; Philippines 2007; Singapore
2006; Sri Lanka 2003, 2005), the 1986 Eurobarometer 25 [8], and
the 2008 European Values Study Wave IV. All generalized trust
data are frequency weighted when available (e.g., WVS S017).
Data on political institutions are based on the following: (a) legal
structure and security of property rights, (b) state regulation of
credit, labor, and business, and (c) size of government measures
drawn from the Economic Freedom of the World Dataset [68]. All
three measures are used to capture legal property rights,
government regulation of markets, and universality, respectively,
and range from 0 (‘no economic freedom’) to 10 (‘total economic
freedom’). Following prior research [15,42,69], we include a
squared polynomial term for legal structure and security of
property rights. To measure labor market regulations, we use the
worker’s rights variable from Cingranelli and Richards [70]. To
operationalize power-sharing capacity, we standardize and sum
the following four measures: the political rights measure from
United Nations Freedom House web resources, the power-sharing
regime measure from Norris [71], the executive authority measure
from the Polity IV Project, and the democracy measure from the
Polity IV Project (a=.95) (note: greater values indicate greater
power-sharing capacity).
We also control for a number of other factors that might
confound the relationship between political institutions and
generalized trust [10,14,72,73]: first, we include income inequality
based on the gini coefficient drawn from various sources (see Table
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
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taken from the Encyclopedia Britannica and CIA World Factbook,
which consists of the percent largest ethnic and linguistic groups in
a country summed and divided by two (a=.73); third, we include
the natural log of gross domestic product per capita (constant year
2000 US$) from the World Bank to measure economic
development and modernization; and fourth, we include a number
of time-invariant variables that control for factors related to a
country’s culture and values [49,74,75,76,77]–these include
variables for countries with absolute or constitutional monarchies
(Monarchy); for countries with Scandinavian cultural heritages
such as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
(Nordic); for a country’s average coldest month of the year in
Celsius scale (Temperature); for license to pronoun-drop in the
official language of a country (Pronoun-Drop); and for countries
with former Marxist-Leninist governments (Former Communist)
(for our sample, these countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine).
All of these time-invariant controls consistently relate to, or have
been used as instrumental variables for, generalized trust in prior
research. We thus expect countries with constitutional or absolute
monarchies and countries with Scandinavian cultural heritages to
have higher levels of generalized trust than other countries. As
Bjørnksov [49,50,72] has argued, monarchies engender national
identity, collective unity, and social stability in a country that
ought to foster generalized trust even in the face of economic and
political cleavages, while countries with Scandinavian cultural
heritages should promote generalized trust as a result of their
economic, political, and social exceptionalism [14]. Following
Bjørnksov [50], we also expect countries with extremely cold
winters to exhibit high levels of generalized trust as harsh winters
supposedly foster greater interdependence among strangers than
countries with milder winters where individuals can rely on their
immediate family and friends for survival. We also expect
countries with official languages that permit dropping of the
personal pronoun to exhibit lower levels of generalized trust than
countries with official languages that forbid such practices:
dropping the first person pronoun is typical of cultural traditions
that place greater emphasis on collectivism, while forbidding first
person pronoun drop is typical of cultural traditions that place a
greater emphasis on individualism [48,77]. Finally, generalized
trust should be lower in former Marxist-Leninist governments as a
result of (a) the economic and political dismantling within these
countries after the fall of communism, and (b) the oppressive
behavior of the former communist dictatorships [78,79].
To reduce problems of simultaneity, all independent variables
are lagged period t–k and correspond to the lagged t–k generalized
trust survey year. See Table S1 for a description of the data sets
and Table 1 for descriptive statistics.
Model Specification
In our first set of estimates, we model generalized trust as a
function of the political-institutional variables and controls by
pooling the time-series of the country sample and using OLS
regression (model not shown formally). We then model generalized
trust using random- and fixed-effects estimation techniques. The
random-effects estimation is modeled as follows:
GeneralizedTrusti,t~aizb1GeneralizedTrusti,t{kzb2X2,i,t{kz...
zbzXz,i,t{kzp3W3,iz...zpzWz,izni,tzei,t
where i represents each country and t represents each time period
(with t=1–6 waves); GeneralizedTrusti,t is the generalized trust
dependent variable for country i at period t; GeneralizedTrusti,t–k and
Xz,i,t–k are respectively generalized trust and time-variant predic-
tors for country i during period t–k where k is the most adjacent
period to t; Wz,i are time-invariant predictors for country i; bz are
the coefficients for the time-variant predictors; pz are the
coefficients for the time-invariant predictors; ai represents the
between-country constant term, ni,t is the between-country error
term, and ei,t is the within-country error term.
Random-effects estimation techniques assume that the variation
across entities is random and uncorrelated with predictors in the
model. The advantage of random-effects estimation is the ability to
include time-invariant regressors such as Scandinavian cultural
Table 1. Description of variables and summary statistics.
Variables Unit Mean SD Min Max
Generalized trust Proportion of sample who believe that others can be trusted. 29.79 16.12 2.81 76.12
Legal property rights 10= Property protection to 1= no property protection. 6.47 1.69 2.70 9.60
State regulations 10= No market regulation to 1= complete regulation. 5.81 1.02 2.50 8.80
Worker’s rights 2= Worker’s rights fully protected to 0= severely restricted. 1.41 0.79 0.00 2.00
Size of government 10= Market allocation of resources to 1= Government allocation. 5.46 1.77 1.60 9.10
Power-sharing capacity Standardized index (greater values equal greater power-sharing). 0.31 0.70 22.20 0.77
Income inequality Absolute inequality from 0–100. 37.11 11.16 20.70 74.33
Ethnolinguistic homogeneity (% largest ethnic group + % largest linguistic group)/2. 81.57 16.28 29.30 100
ln(GDP) ln(gross domestic product per capita, constant year 2000 US$). 8.62 1.26 5.65 10.51
Monarchy 1= Monarchy, 0= otherwise. 0.27 – 0 1
Nordic 1= Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, 0= otherwise. 0.09 – 0 1
Temperature Average temperature (Celsius) in the coldest month of the year. 7.08 9.92 211 27
Pronoun-drop 1= license to pronoun-drop in the official language, 0= otherwise. 0.66 – 0 1
Former communist 1= former Marxist-Leninist states, 0= otherwise. 0.17 – 0 1
No. countries =74, No. observations =174 for all variables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.t001
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then the random-effects estimates are biased and inconsistent. This
would suggest the use of fixed-effects estimation, which is modeled
as follows:
GeneralizedTrusti,t~aizb1GeneralizedTrusti,t{k
zb2X2,i,t{kz...zbzXz,i,tkzei,t
where i represents each country and t represents each time period
(with t=1–6 waves); GeneralizedTrusti,t is the generalized trust
dependent variable for country i at period t; GeneralizedTrusti,t–k and
Xz,i,t–k are respectively generalized trust and time-variant predic-
tors for country i during period t–k where k is the most adjacent
period to t; bz are the coefficients for the time-variant predictors; ai
represents the country-specific constant term and ei,t is the error
term.
We estimate our models using fixed-effects to allow for non-
independence of observations within countries and to examine
variation within countries and thus control for unobserved
heterogeneity between countries. In other words, with fixed-effects
estimation we control for time-invariant country-specific unob-
served confounding variables. For instance, countries vary
according to their legal origins, be it common, civil, or Islamic
law that indirectly influence the development of generalized trust
[47]. This explanation, however, emphasizes variance between
countries, not within. Fixed-effects estimation controls for such
country-specific explanations. Thus, unobserved variables do not
change over time with fixed-effects estimation and, as a result, any
changes in generalized trust must be due to predictors in the model
and not due to time-invariant characteristics such as culture.
Results
Table S2 lists all generalized trust values by country and wave.
The observations were abstracted from numerous cross-national
public opinion data sets between 1980 and 2009. The unbalanced
panel data are for 6 time periods with a total of 74 countries and
248 observations. See Table S2 for sources of generalized trust
data. Replicating Roth [8], Table S2 highlights extensive variation
within and between countries, with a strong decline in generalized
trust for many countries across time. Figure 1 presents a plot of
these temporal trends. The figure clearly shows that generalized
trust has steadily increased for some countries (e.g., Denmark and
Norway), while it has remained stable (e.g., Belgium, Brazil, and
Ecuador) or steeply decreased for numerous others (e.g.,
Guatemala and Mexico). Figure 2 decomposes these temporal
trends by country type. As expected, the figure shows that Nordic
countries and monarchies exhibit much higher levels of general-
ized trust than either Latin American or former communist
countries. Moreover, monarchies and Nordic countries generally
reveal either growth or stability in generalized trust, while
generalized trust in Latin American and former communist
countries is either slowly growing or slowly decaying.
For all analyses, including the pooled-time series OLS estimates
and the fixed- and random-effects estimates, we (a) exclude
Greece, Iran, Nigeria, and Malawi as it is common in the literature
to do so [8,10] and since all four consistently exhibit extreme
values across a number of outlier tests; (b) found that multi-
collinearity was only an issue for the property rights polynomial
and that centering the two property rights terms did not
substantively alter the results presented here–the variance inflation
factor (i.e., VIF) for all other coefficients in the pooled-time series
OLS models was well below (less than 4.0) the typical cut-off value
of 10.0 [80]; (c) did not employ robust standard errors or robust-
cluster standard errors by country since the Breusch-Pagan test for
hetereoskedasticity revealed constant variance for all pooled time-
series OLS models; and (d) provide one-tailed tests throughout.
Pooled Time-series Analysis
Table 2 presents a series of nested pooled time-series ordinary
least squares regression models. Model 1 includes the key political
institutional predictors and indicates that all variables, except for
power-sharing capacity, have the expected signs and that only the
legal property rights, state regulation, and size of government
coefficients are statistically significant. As anticipated, increases in
legal property rights undermine generalized trust at low levels of
Figure 1. Generalized trust in 74 countries, 1980 to 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.g001
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35120property rights protection. This negative effect, however, attenu-
ates as the robustness of legal property rights increases. In other
words, property rights institutions retard generalized trust in
countries that have initial low levels of property rights protection
but enhance generalized trust for countries that have fairly robust
property rights institutions (see Figure 3). But note how the
increasing effect of legal property rights on generalized trust is
relatively much greater than the decreasing effect. This suggests
that although legal property rights undermine generalized trust at
low levels of property rights protection, the effect is relatively
minor. Model 1 also shows that market deregulations and
universal socioeconomic provisions promote generalized trust.
Overall, the terms in model 1 do an excellent job of accounting for
variance in generalized trust (R
2=.84) and tend to parallel prior
results [19,22,42].
Models 2 through 4 include nested controls for economic
cleavages (i.e., income inequality), social cleavages (i.e., ethnolin-
guistic homogeneity), and modernization (i.e., gross domestic
product), respectively. As expected, income inequality exhibits a
statistically significant negative sign across all models and appears
to mediate the relationship between size of government and
generalized trust. Model 3 reveals the relationship between
ethnolinguistic homogeneity and generalized trust to be statisti-
cally insignificant. Although this result appears to contradict prior
research [14,46], it parallels recent findings using larger samples
[42,72]. We also see that the relationship between GDP and
generalized trust is statistically significant and positive, which
supports Roth’s [8] pooled time-series OLS models exploring the
relationship between economic growth and generalized trust.
Besides size of government, all other political-institutional
parameter estimates and standard errors are consistent from
models 2 through 4.
Finally, model 5 includes the time-invariant controls–Monar-
chy, Nordic, Temperature, Pronoun-Drop, and Former Com-
munist–and shows that the substantive story changes very little
from model 4 to model 5 and that only the Monarchy and
Nordic dummy variables are in the expected direction and
statistically significant. All other time-invariant controls are
statistically insignificant, which fails to support prior research
[49,72]. Interestingly, GDP becomes statistically insignificant
when controlling for the time-invariant factors, some of which
were absent from Roth’s [8] sensitivity analysis. Note that robust-
cluster standard errors by country did not substantively alter the
results presented here.
In short, the pooled time-series OLS analysis reveals the
following: legal property rights and generalized trust are
monotonically related–generalized trust increases at an increasing
rate with legal property rights; government regulation of markets
undermines generalized trust (higher values of state regulation
indicate less market regulation); income inequality retards
generalized trust; and Monarchies and Nordic countries are
generally more trusting, on average, than other countries.
Panel Analysis
In order to control for unobservable time-invariant factors (e.g.,
cultural history) and to explore how changes in predictors over
time but not across countries affect generalized trust, we estimate a
series of fixed- and random-effects panel models. As stated before,
fixed-effects models estimate differences within countries while
random-effects models estimate differences across countries as well
Figure 2. Generalized trust by monarchy, Nordic, Latin America, and former communist, 1980 to 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.g002
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35120as across time-periods. To test whether or not the variation across
countries is correlated with the predictors in the models (i.e.,
independence assumption), we use the Hausman specification test
[81]; the test indicates that fixed-effects estimation techniques
should be used (the test statistic for models 7 and 8 in Table 3 is x
2
(10)=91.46, which rejects the null hypothesis of independence).
We nevertheless explore both fixed- and random-effects estimation
for purposes of comparison. We also conducted joint tests on all
fixed-effects models in Table 3 to see if dummy variables for time
are equal to zero. The results suggest that time fixed effects are not
needed. As before, we exclude Greece, Iran, Nigeria, and Malawi
and use one-tailed tests throughout. We investigate alternative
modeling specifications in our sensitivity analysis.
Table 2. Generalized trust and political institutions: A pooled panel analysis.
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Generalized trust, t–k .84*** (.05) .81*** (.05) .81*** (.05) .81*** (.05) .66*** (.06)
Legal property rights, t–k 28.80*** (2.18) 28.74*** (2.13) 28.61*** (2.15) 28.41*** (2.14) 27.21*** (2.21)
Legal property rights
2, t–k .71*** (.17) .66*** (.17) .66*** (.17) .59*** (.17) .53** (.18)
State regulation, t–k 1.51* (.73) 2.02** (.73) 1.98** (.74) 1.86** (.73) 1.37* (.74)
Worker’s rights, t–k 1.63 (1.00) 1.51 (.99) 1.55 (.99) 1.17 (1.00) 1.00 (.98)
Size of government, t–k 21.11** (.42) 2.69 (.44) 2.71 (.44) 2.70 (.44) 2.24 (.46)
Power-sharing capacity, t–k 21.38 (1.04) 21.25 (1.02) 21.22 (1.02) 21.71 (1.04) 21.57 (1.04)
Income inequality, t–k 2.19** (.07) 2.20** (.07) 2.21** (.07) 2.21** (.08)
Ethnolinguistic homogeneity, t–k 2.02 (.04) 2.04 (.04) 2.03 (.04)
ln(gross domestic product), t–k 1.52* (.78) .82 (.84)
Monarchy 2.53* (1.52)
Nordic 7.36*** (2.29)
Temperature 2.11 (.09)
Pronoun-drop .15 (1.67)
Former communist 22.29 (2.02)
Constant 25.57** (8.61) 29.85** (8.58) 31.47*** (9.04) 23.72** (9.80) 28.74** (10.45)
R
2 .84 .84 .84 .85 .86
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p,.05;
**p,.01;
***p,.001 (one-tailed tests).
No. countries =74; No. observations =174.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.t002
Figure 3. Legal property rights, t–k and generalized trust, 1980 to 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.g003
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35120T
a
b
l
e
3
.
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
t
r
u
s
t
a
n
d
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
:
f
i
x
e
d
-
a
n
d
r
a
n
d
o
m
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
t
h
o
d
F
E
R
E
F
E
R
E
F
E
R
E
F
E
R
E
R
E
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
M
o
d
e
l
1
M
o
d
e
l
2
M
o
d
e
l
3
M
o
d
e
l
4
M
o
d
e
l
5
M
o
d
e
l
6
M
o
d
e
l
7
M
o
d
e
l
8
M
o
d
e
l
9
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
t
r
u
s
t
,
t
–
k
.
0
1
(
.
1
0
)
.
7
0
*
*
*
(
.
0
6
)
.
0
1
(
.
1
0
)
.
6
7
*
*
*
(
.
0
6
)
.
0
1
(
.
1
0
)
.
6
8
*
*
*
(
.
0
6
)
.
0
1
(
.
1
0
)
.
6
7
*
*
*
(
.
0
6
)
.
5
0
*
*
*
(
.
0
7
)
L
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
r
i
g
h
t
s
,
t
–
k
2
6
.
2
6
*
(
2
.
7
9
)
2
8
.
4
9
*
*
*
(
2
.
3
2
)
2
6
.
2
6
*
(
2
.
8
1
)
2
8
.
5
2
*
*
*
(
2
.
2
7
)
2
6
.
2
7
*
(
2
.
8
3
)
2
8
.
5
3
*
*
*
(
2
.
2
8
)
2
7
.
2
1
*
*
(
3
.
0
1
)
2
8
.
2
8
*
*
*
(
2
.
2
5
)
2
7
.
3
3
*
*
*
(
2
.
2
5
)
L
e
g
a
l
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
r
i
g
h
t
s
2
,
t
–
k
.
4
4
*
(
.
2
0
)
.
6
8
*
*
*
(
.
1
8
)
.
4
4
*
(
.
2
1
)
.
6
5
*
*
*
(
.
1
8
)
.
4
4
*
(
.
2
1
)
.
6
5
*
*
*
(
.
1
8
)
.
5
3
*
(
.
2
3
)
.
5
8
*
*
*
(
.
1
8
)
.
5
2
*
*
(
.
1
8
)
S
t
a
t
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
t
–
k
1
.
3
3
*
(
.
7
1
)
1
.
9
9
*
*
(
.
7
2
)
1
.
3
2
*
(
.
7
4
)
2
.
3
7
*
*
*
(
.
7
3
)
1
.
3
1
*
(
.
7
7
)
2
.
3
7
*
*
*
(
.
7
3
)
1
.
4
6
*
(
.
7
9
)
2
.
1
7
*
*
(
.
7
3
)
1
.
6
3
*
(
.
7
2
)
W
o
r
k
e
r
’
s
r
i
g
h
t
s
,
t
–
k
2
.
9
4
*
*
(
1
.
1
7
)
2
.
9
2
*
*
(
1
.
0
6
)
2
.
9
5
*
*
(
1
.
1
8
)
2
.
4
2
*
*
(
1
.
0
4
)
2
.
9
3
*
*
(
1
.
1
9
)
2
.
4
2
*
*
(
1
.
0
5
)
3
.
1
0
*
*
(
1
.
2
1
)
1
.
9
5
*
(
1
.
0
5
)
1
.
6
9
*
(
1
.
0
2
)
S
i
z
e
o
f
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
t
–
k
2
1
.
5
7
*
(
.
7
3
)
2
1
.
3
9
*
*
*
(
.
4
9
)
2
1
.
5
7
*
(
.
7
4
)
2
.
8
7
*
(
.
5
1
)
2
1
.
5
7
*
(
.
7
4
)
2
.
8
7
*
(
.
5
1
)
2
1
.
4
0
*
(
.
7
7
)
2
.
7
9
(
.
5
0
)
2
.
2
8
(
.
5
2
)
P
o
w
e
r
-
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
,
t
–
k
2
6
.
4
8
*
*
*
(
1
.
5
7
)
2
2
.
1
8
*
(
1
.
1
5
)
2
6
.
4
7
*
*
*
(
1
.
5
8
)
2
1
.
8
8
*
(
1
.
1
2
)
2
6
.
4
6
*
*
*
(
1
.
5
9
)
2
1
.
8
8
*
(
1
.
1
2
)
2
5
.
8
5
*
*
*
(
1
.
7
3
)
2
2
.
4
7
*
(
1
.
1
5
)
2
2
.
3
2
*
(
1
.
1
3
)
I
n
c
o
m
e
i
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
t
–
k
.
0
1
(
.
2
1
)
2
.
2
3
*
*
(
.
0
8
)
.
0
1
(
.
2
1
)
2
.
2
3
*
*
(
.
0
8
)
.
0
1
(
.
2
1
)
2
.
2
3
*
*
(
.
0
8
)
2
.
2
1
*
(
.
0
9
)
E
t
h
n
o
l
i
n
g
u
i
s
t
i
c
h
o
m
o
g
e
n
e
i
t
y
,
t
–
k
2
.
0
2
(
.
1
8
)
.
0
0
1
(
.
0
5
)
2
.
0
5
(
.
1
8
)
2
.
0
3
(
.
0
5
)
2
.
0
2
(
.
0
5
)
l
n
(
g
r
o
s
s
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
)
,
t
–
k
2
3
.
5
5
(
3
.
8
2
)
2
.
0
2
*
(
.
9
5
)
.
8
3
(
1
.
0
1
)
M
o
n
a
r
c
h
y
4
.
3
3
*
(
2
.
0
9
)
N
o
r
d
i
c
9
.
4
8
*
*
(
3
.
2
6
)
T
e
m
p
e
r
a
t
u
r
e
2
.
1
7
(
.
1
1
)
P
r
o
n
o
u
n
-
d
r
o
p
2
1
.
5
6
(
2
.
3
3
)
F
o
r
m
e
r
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
2
2
.
8
9
(
2
.
6
7
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
4
8
.
9
9
*
*
*
2
6
.
1
6
*
*
4
8
.
5
7
*
*
*
3
2
.
1
7
*
*
*
5
0
.
0
1
*
3
2
.
0
7
*
*
*
8
3
.
2
9
*
2
0
.
8
7
*
3
2
.
3
9
*
*
R
2
w
i
t
h
i
n
.
2
3
.
0
6
.
2
3
.
0
5
.
2
3
.
0
5
.
2
4
.
0
5
.
0
6
R
2
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
.
0
1
.
8
4
.
0
1
.
8
6
.
0
1
.
8
6
.
1
1
.
8
7
.
8
6
s
n
1
4
.
9
3
4
.
5
0
1
4
.
9
8
4
.
1
2
1
5
.
1
0
4
.
1
5
1
7
.
9
4
3
.
9
8
4
.
0
0
s
e
4
.
6
2
4
.
6
2
4
.
6
4
4
.
6
4
4
.
6
7
4
.
6
7
4
.
6
7
4
.
6
7
4
.
6
7
r
.
9
1
.
4
9
.
9
1
.
4
4
.
9
1
.
4
4
.
9
4
.
4
2
.
4
2
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
*
p
,
.
0
5
;
*
*
p
,
.
0
1
;
*
*
*
p
,
.
0
0
1
(
o
n
e
-
t
a
i
l
e
d
t
e
s
t
)
.
N
o
.
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
=
7
4
;
N
o
.
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
=
1
7
4
.
d
o
i
:
1
0
.
1
3
7
1
/
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
.
p
o
n
e
.
0
0
3
5
1
2
0
.
t
0
0
3
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35120Table 4. Sensitivity analysis: fixed-effects estimation.
Row LPR LPR
2 SR WR SoG PSC N Obser.
1 Baseline: Model 7, Table 3 27.21*** .53** 1.46* 3.10*** 21.40* 25.85*** 74 174
Influential Cases
2 With Greece, Iran, Nigeria, and Malawi 24.94* .38* 1.23 2.60** 2.76 25.80*** 78 181
3 No China 27.23** .53** 1.46* 3.11*** 21.44* 25.86*** 73 171
4 No China, Pakistan, Egypt, Thailand,
Singapore, and Indonesia
26.89** .52** 1.40* 3.03*** 21.44* 25.19*** 68 165
Country Samples
5 No Asia 29.85*** .75*** 1.51* 3.45*** 21.62* 27.91*** 60 147
6 No Eastern religions 27.30** .54** 1.46* 3.13*** 21.48* 25.85*** 69 164
7 No Africa 27.29*** .53** 1.55* 3.12*** 21.42* 25.85*** 66 165
8 No Africa + Asia 210.04*** .75*** 1.59* 3.46*** 21.64* 27.99*** 52 138
9 No Latin America 27.39 .51 1.74* 4.06*** 21.96** 26.62*** 56 133
10 No Nordic 24.23 .26 1.07 2.73** 21.08 26.20*** 69 159
11 No former communist 28.05*** .56*** 2.69** 2.19 22.18** 25.18*** 60 144
12 No UN undeveloped 211.29 .73 2.02 5.16*** 22.70*** 214.62*** 35 101
13 No liberal 28.98*** .77*** .99 2.59** 2.31 25.08*** 68 155
14 No conservative 26.43** .46* 1.36 3.03*** 21.05 25.83*** 68 152
15 No social democratic 23.28 .17 .81 2.57** 21.40* 26.63*** 68 153
16 No English legal origins 28.99*** .77*** .93 2.38* 2.32 24.53** 61 146
17 No French legal origins 29.77 .66 1.62 4.40*** 21.87 25.43* 39 92
18 No dictator since 1980 210.09** .69** 1.23 3.55*** 22.13*** 29.09*** 56 136
19 No internal war last 10 years 211.45*** .87*** 1.08 2.98* 21.43* 23.28 59 138
20 No Protestant 25.60* .42* 1.05 2.65** 2.43 25.55*** 66 148
21 No Muslim 27.69** .55** 1.49* 2.77** 21.16 25.04*** 64 159
Variable Specifications
22 With migrant stock 28.51** .63** 1.92** 3.13** 21.76** 25.35*** 73 169
23 With unemployment 26.80** .48** 1.61** 2.77** 21.02 25.85*** 74 169
24 With religious homogeneity 27.04** .51** 1.54* 3.12** 21.42* 25.77*** 74 174
25 With percent female 27.26** .54** 1.42* 3.06** 21.42* 25.85*** 74 174
26 With tenure of political system 29.66** .75** 1.89** 2.92** 21.46** 25.36** 47 174
Restructuring of Data
27 2 waves (bal.) 26.39** .50* 2.34*** 1.82 .88 25.08*** 52 104
28
{ 3 waves (bal.) 3.03** – .73 1.26 2.25 26.81* 17 51
29 Lagged variables, t–1 27.37** .61*** 1.17 2.95*** 2.84 27.06*** 72 153
Methods
30 No generalized trust, t–k 27.20*** .53** 1.45* 3.09*** 21.40* 25.87*** 74 174
31 Robust SE 27.21** .53** 1.46* 3.10*** 21.40 25.85*** 74 174
32 Bootstrap SE: 1,000 repetitions 27.21** .53** 1.46* 3.10*** 21.40 25.85*** 74 174
33 Jackknife 27.21** .53* 1.46 3.10*** 21.40 25.85*** 74 174
34 Wave dummies 26.92* .56** 1.34 2.69** 2.93 25.16*** 74 174
35 MVN multiple imp.: 20 Imput. 26.37*** .49*** 1.51** 2.94*** 2.96 25.05*** 91 216
36 MVN multiple imp.: 100 Imput. 26.47*** .50*** 1.53** 3.00*** 2.96 24.98*** 91 216
37
{ AR(1) 29.30*** .67*** 2.21*** 1.45 2.72 22.16* 74 174
{=Model 1, Table 3 FE estimation.
{=Model 8, Table 3 RE estimation.
*p,.05;
**p,.025;
***p,.01 (one-tailed tests).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035120.t004
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fixed- and random-effects estimation techniques instead. With the
exception of Worker’s Rights and Power-Sharing Capacity, we see
that the random-effects models (i.e., models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9)
parallel the pooled time-series ordinary least squares regression
models found in Table 3. In other words, once we treat differences
within- and between-countries across time as random variables
and loosen the assumption of no unique attributes of countries and
no universal effects across time, labor market regulations increase
generalized trust and power-sharing capacities decrease general-
ized trust. The fixed-effects models, however, paint a different
picture (see models 1, 3, 5, and 7): the results simultaneously
support and contradict findings from prior empirical work and the
pooled time-series OLS regression models in Table 3. Regardless
of the fixed-effects model, all of the political-institutional variables
are statistically significant. But unlike the OLS and random-effects
models, income inequality is statistically unrelated to generalized
trust once we time-demean the panel data (see models 3, 5, and 7).
The fixed-effects estimates suggest that income inequality does not
mediate the relationship between size of government and
generalized trust. Gross domestic product is negatively related to
generalized trust but statistically insignificant when using fixed-
effects estimates (see model 7). Interestingly, when coupled with
prior findings, this suggests that the causal relationship between
economic growth and generalized trust runs not from growth to
trust but from trust to growth. The interpretation for all
statistically significant fixed-effects coefficients is as follows: for
given country i,a sX varies across time by one unit, generalized
trust increases or decreases by b units. For instance, for given
country i, as power-sharing capacity increases by one-unit across
time, generalized trust decreases by 5.85 units (see model 7).
To explore alternative model specifications, we investigated
whether or not the relationship between (a) gross domestic product
and generalized trust and (b) power-sharing capacity and
generalized trust were monotonic as argued by Roth [8] and as
illustrated in a scatter plot, respectively. We did not find a
statistically significant curvilinear relationship in our models for
either specification (these findings held even when excluding legal
property rights for both and gross domestic product for power-
sharing capacity). Following Rothstein and Stolle [20] and Tsai et
al. [42], we also explored a three-way interaction between legal
property rights, power-sharing capacity, and worker’s rights. We
introduced these terms to models 1 and 2 in Table 3. While the
random-effects estimates replicated Tsai et al.’s [42] findings, the
fixed-effects estimates did not. This suggests that their findings are
likely an artifact of simultaneity or unobserved heterogeneity. We
also explored interaction effects between ethnolinguistic homoge-
neity and migrant stock (as % of the population) in models 5 and 6,
Table 3. Once again, the interaction effects were statistically
insignificant. Results for all aforementioned alternative model
specifications are available upon request.
Sensitivity Analysis
The fixed-effects estimates appear to simultaneously support
and challenge prior work using OLS, HLM, and 2SLS cross-
sectional designs (e.g., [22,49]) as well as cross-lagged structural
equation panel models [18]. Since this is the case, we follow
Wilson and Butler [82] and test the robustness and sensitivity of
the results with respect to the key political-institutional variables.
Table 4 reveals numerous specification tests that exclude possible
influential cases, alter the countries included, investigate alterna-
tive control variables, restructure the panel data, and employ
alternative model specifications. We use model 7 in Table 3 as the
baseline model (see Row 1). Rows 2 through 4 alter the inclusion
and exclusion of influential cases. As can be inferred, both the state
regulations and size of government variables are sensitive to the
inclusion of Greece, Iran, Nigeria, and Malawi (Row 2). This is
expected as all four countries generate extreme values and, as a
result, are considered influential cases that bias parameter
estimates. While excluding China–a commonly excluded country
in the generalized trust literature (e.g.,[10])–and other slightly
influential cases such as Pakistan, Egypt, Thailand, Singapore, and
Indonesia somewhat alter the size of the political-institutional
coefficients, they all remain statistically significant (Rows 3 and 4,
respectively). In short, the fixed-effects estimates for the political-
institutional variables are fairly robust to the exclusion of
influential cases.
Rows 5 through 21 examine alternative country samples.
Following Delhey et al. [66] and Torpe and Lolle [67], we explore
the baseline model while excluding Asian and African countries
(based on the United Nations categorization of Asian and African
countries, see Row 5) and while excluding countries with majority
populations practicing Eastern religions (see Row 6). This is done
since individuals in Asian, African, and Confucian countries
respond to the operationalization of generalized trust with a
smaller radius in mind than individuals in other countries. Rows 5
through 8 shows that excluding these countries alone or in concert
does not substantively alter the political-institutional fixed-effects
estimates, while omitting Latin American and Nordic countries
does (see Rows 9 and 10, respectively). Without Latin American
countries, the legal property rights polynomial term becomes
statistically insignificant, while the baseline model without Nordic
countries yields insignificant effects for legal property rights, state
regulations, and size of government. This suggests that the
curvilinear effect for legal property rights is sensitive to Latin
American and Nordic countries, which is intuitive since the upper-
right quadrant of Figure 2 primarily consists of Nordic countries
and the lower-left quadrant is primarily Latin American countries.
In the absence of these countries, we would expect to see
insignificant curvilinear coefficients for legal property rights. With
respect to state regulations and size of government, both terms are
nearly statistically insignificant, so it is intuitive that excluding
countries with an emphasis on the universality of socioeconomic
provisions and free-market competition would fuel the effects of
both variables.
Next, we see that omitting former communist countries, liberal
or conservative welfare states [we use Esping-Anderson’s [83]
typology of welfare states–liberal (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States), conservative
(Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland), and
social-democratic (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Nor-
way, and Sweden)], countries with English legal origins, countries
that have experienced any sort of dictatorship since 1980,
countries that have experienced civil war within the last ten years
of the survey year, and countries with Protestant or Muslim
majority populations (i.e., 50% or more) did not substantively alter
the statistical significance for the polynomial legal property rights
term (see Rows 11 through 21). However, omitting undeveloped
nations (as categorized by the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs), social democratic welfare states, and
countries with French legal origins did. Once again, this is the case
as many of the social democracies are Nordic countries and many
of the undeveloped and French legal origin countries are Latin
American nations. The state regulations variable, on the other
hand, is extremely sensitive to the exclusion of certain countries
(except Latin American, Former Communist, and Muslim
countries), while the worker’s rights and power-sharing capacity
variables are very robust to the omission of cases (except Former
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust
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like many of the other political institutional variables, appears to
be sensitive to the omission of Nordic countries, welfare states,
legal origins, and Protestant or Muslim majoritarian countries.
Rows 22 through 26 explore the robustness of the baseline
model’s coefficients and standard errors to the inclusion of
alternative control variables occasionally used in the literature
[42,48,50]. We show that including World Bank data on either
migrant stock (as % of the population), unemployment (as % of the
labor force), or percent female (as % of total population) does not
substantively alter the results for any of the political-institutional
variables, except for size of government (see Row 23). Moreover,
the findings are robust to religious homogeneity (as % largest
religious group; from Britannica Book of the Year and CIA World
Factbook) and tenure of political system (see Database of Political
Institutions). Note: none of these control variables are statistically
significant (not shown; results available upon request).
Rows 27 and 28 examine balanced panels models for the time
periods 1999 to 2009 and 1994 to 2009, respectively. Despite
balancing the data for 2 waves (see Row 27), many of the key
political-institutional parameter estimates and standard errors
parallel the baseline model: legal property rights increase
generalized trust at an increasing rate, market deregulations
increase generalized trust, and power-sharing capacity decreases
generalized trust, while labor market regulations (i.e., worker’s
rights) and the universality of socioeconomic provisions become
statistically insignificant. Yet, when using a balanced panel with 17
countries and 51 observations over three waves, all key political-
institutional variables lose statistical significance due to the small
number of observations. But when we drop the polynomial term
for legal property rights, the non-monotonic relationship between
legal property rights and generalized trust becomes statistically
significant as well as the coefficient for power-sharing capacity (see
Row 28). We also see that using different time-series altered the
statistical significance of some political-institutional predictors;
Row 29 uses 1-period lagged variables and suggests that although
the statistical significance for property rights, worker’s rights, and
power sharing capacity remain unchanged, state regulations and
size of government yield statistically insignificant coefficients.
Row 30 shows the baseline model without the t–k lagged
generalized trust predictor. Doing so did not dramatically change
the baseline model. Using robust standard errors (Row 31) and
Bootstrap estimation with 1,000 repetitions (Row 32), however,
rendered a statistically insignificant coefficient for size of
government. Interestingly, both the state regulations and size of
government variables became statistically insignificant with the use
of Jackknife estimation (Row 33). And exploring time fixed-effects
estimates with dummies for wave only altered the statistical
significance of the state regulations and size of government
parameters (Row 34).
Rows 35 and 36 examine the baseline model with imputation
methods found in Stata12. The multiple imputation technique we
use fills in missing values of the predictors and controls using
multivariate normal regression with an iterative Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. We used a burn-in of 10,000 and
calculated 1,000 MCMC iterations between imputations. The
initial values of the MCMC chain were obtained from 1,000
expectation-maximum (EM) iterations. MCMC chain figures and
plots revealed convergence. All missing values were imputed using
predictors from model 5 in Table 2 plus dummies for wave,
proportional representation, civil war after 1945, dictatorship since
1980, welfare-state typologies, regional location, and majoritarian
religion. We also included continuous measures of the Herftot
index (see Database of Political Institutions), tenure of political
system (see Database of Political Institutions), and a country’s
death rate (see World Bank). Finally, the relative variance increase
(RVI) for the imputation models in Rows 35 and 36 were .22 and
.23, respectively. Rows 35 and 36 specified 20 and 100
imputations to add, respectively. When comparing the baseline
model to the imputation models, we see that although some of the
coefficients changed in magnitude and that the number of
countries increased from 74 to 91 and the number of observations
increased from 174 to 216, respectively, the directions of effect and
statistical significance of the coefficients remained unchanged
except for the size of government coefficient.
Finally, Row 37 reveals the results of a first-order autoregressive
random-effects model using the terms found in model 8, Table 3.
We use random-effects estimation instead of fixed-effects estima-
tion as the first-order autoregressive fixed-effects model yields
inflated standard errors and directions of effect that deviate from
the other fixed-effects models. This is the case as the number of
countries and observations is reduced from 74 and 174 to 56 and
100, respectively. A small number of cases, observations, and
panels can bias parameter estimates and standard errors when
using first-order autoregressive fixed-effects modeling techniques
[84]. Regardless, the standard errors are unbiased when
comparing random-effects models with and without first-order
autocorrelation (Model 8, Table 3 vs. Row 37, Table 4).
Discussion
The political-institutional origins of generalized trust have long
eluded social scientists. Although decades of research point to a
possible association, no one study has provided convincing
evidence for causal ordering–the ubiquity of cross-sectional designs
and the use of theoretically invalid instrumental variables prohibit
such conclusions. In an effort to advance the literature and address
lingering issues of unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity, the
present study explores the relationship between political institu-
tions and generalized trust using time-series panel analysis with a
large cross-national sample of countries. In particular, we use
pooled time-series OLS regression and fixed- and random-effects
estimation techniques on a 74 country sample with a total of 248
observations spread over a 29 year time period (from 1980 to
2009) in order to test various competing theoretical models
concerning the political-institutional foundations of generalized
trust. Such an empirical investigation has yet to be done.
The paper, overall, reveals that political institutions simulta-
neously promote and undermine generalized trust. In particular,
we find that property rights institutions are monotonically related
to generalized trust: in countries with ineffective and inefficient
property rights, an increase in their effectiveness leads to a
decrease in generalized trust. This effect applies to undeveloped,
developing, and Latin American countries. In countries with fairly
effective and efficient property rights, an increase in their
effectiveness leads to an increase in generalized trust (especially
in social democratic and Nordic countries). Interestingly, this effect
is one of the least sensitive of the political-institutional factors to
the restructuring of data, statistical modifications, countries
included (or excluded), influential cases, and confounding control
variables.
Our analysis provides support for the argument that political-
institutional incentives foster expectations and beliefs about the
reliability of anonymous others, and that effective legal structures
and property rights institutions create an environment where
common knowledge about the trustworthiness of strangers can
grow. Although the results suggest that property rights undermine
generalized trust at low levels of protection, the increasing effect of
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than its undermining effect at low levels of contract enforcement.
All of which buttress Bohnet, Frey, and Huck’s experimental
findings: ‘‘The worst legal regime is not one in which contracts
cannot be enforced but one with an intermediate level of
enforceability’’ [69]. Strictly speaking, regimes with intermediate
levels of property rights protection neither adequately prosecute
malfeasance nor leave the guarantee of exchanges solely to
decentralized systems of informal regulation: both of which foster
generalized trust. The former is typical of regimes with high levels
of contract enforcement, while the latter is characteristic of
regimes with low levels contract enforcement, neither of which is
robust with intermediate levels of property rights protection.
Second, we show that market deregulations are positively
related to generalized trust. The finding supports the argument
that economic, business, and credit markets regulated by
government appointed bodies weakens community building, civil
society, and generalized trust [22]. As Taylor [31] suggests, the
likely mechanism accounting for this effect is dependence:
individuals come to depend on government bodies instead of
each other in order to promote social and economic exchange in
the presence of centralized market regulations, thereby diminish-
ing generalized trust. This effect, however, appears to be fueled by
Scandinavian cultural legacies, welfare state typologies, legal
origins, and internal strife, and is also sensitive to the restructuring
of data and resampling techniques. In other words, the
relationship between market deregulations and generalized trust
found in the present study and prior research [22] is likely a
statistical artifact.
Third, unlike economic market regulations, increases in labor
market regulations increase generalized trust. This supports
Bendix’s [33] and Marshall’s [34] classic proposition: government
bodies that regulate labor markets, such as minimum wage laws
for instance, expand the rights and privileges of citizens, which
promotes nationalistic social bonds and social unification and
integration that, in turn, increases generalized trust. Yet we find
that former communist countries, restructured panel data, and
autocorrelation seem to fuel this effect. In spite of this, the labor
market regulations variable is one of the political-institutional
factors least sensitive to sample adjustments, statistical modifica-
tions, resampling techniques, confounding control variables, and
influential cases.
Fourth, in contrast to prior research [18], power-sharing
capacity of the state is negatively related to generalized trust: as
states increasingly share and divide their power–as states
democratize–generalized trust decreases. Embedded in this finding
is an implicit refutation of the merits of democracy and an explicit
confirmation of the idea that democratic governments represent
the special interests of parties [20]. Such regimes create
governance structures biased towards certain interests and
unresponsive to the needs of all citizens, resulting in weakened
generalized trust especially among disadvantaged and excluded
groups. More broadly interpreted, the deleterious impact of
partisan politics on generalized trust is, contrary to Lipset [85],
unavoidable in a stable democracy. Yet an alternative interpre-
tation of the results concerns not the special interests of political
parties per se, but the process of democratization: transitions to
democracy might damage community structures that help foster
social capital and generalized trust under institutional conditions
incompatible with democracy [79,86]. In this approach, the
adaptation to new political-institutional environments and sur-
roundings that result from democratization is what weakens
generalized trust, not the catering to special interests of political
parties. What these two competing arguments suggest is the need
for future research to explicitly disentangle the exact mechanisms
connecting power-sharing capacity to generalized trust, which we
find to be the least sensitive of the political-institutional factors to
any sort of model re-specifications. Only by omitting countries that
have experienced civil war and internal strife within the last
10 years of the survey year (e.g., Algeria and Indonesia) does the
coefficient for power-sharing capacity become statistically insig-
nificant.
Fifth, our models support prior research [19,35,36] and show
that the universality of socioeconomic provisions is related to
generalized trust. To illustrate, universal political institutions, such
as welfare states, foster economic equality, equality of opportunity,
and evenly distributed resources. These types of regimes create the
perception that each citizen has an equal opportunity of success
and failure, regardless of their class, gender, or ethnicity, and that
no one economic actor is more privileged than another; as a
consequence, social cleavages and social barriers break down,
while community building, social cohesion, and social solidarity
grow. All of which should increase generalized trust. Yet we find
the standard errors for size of government–our measure of
universality–to be extremely sensitive to statistical modifications,
countries included or excluded, and confounding control variables.
Moreover, when using either a pooled time-series OLS or a
random-effects panel design, we replicate the negative relationship
between income inequality and generalized trust [10]. But when
we examine the same sample with fixed-effects estimates, we fail to
detect a statistically significant relationship. What all of this
suggests is that theorists and policy analysts should seriously
reconsider the effects that welfare states and income inequality
have on generalized trust in particular and social capital in
general.
To summarize, what appears to matter for generalized trust is
the safety and security granted by property rights institutions, the
centralized regulation of labor markets, and stable regimes that
avoid sudden shifts toward democratization. In contrast, sources of
generalized trust are not found with the deregulation of credit and
business markets or the universality of socioeconomic provisions as
these political-institutional factors are extremely sensitive to
sample adjustments, statistical modifications, resampling tech-
niques, and influential cases. Overall, the findings generate strong
support for various competing theoretical models within the social
sciences: some models suggest that political institutions undermine
generalized trust, while others argue that political institutions
create an environment where generalized trust can grow. We
provide evidence for both–political institutions crowd-in and
crowd-out generalized trust. In spite of the results, future research
should explore the specific elements of legal property rights
institutions and labor market regulations that promote or possibly
undermine generalized trust–such as judicial independence,
impartial courts, private ownership of banks, private sector credit,
and conscription–and investigate panel-data with two-stage least
squares when theoretically and empirically valid instrumental
variables for political institutions are available.
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